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The ﬁrst important work of comparative law and politics to deﬁne, analyse and evaluate the
global phenomenon of the ‘judicialisation of politics’ was Tate and Vallinder’s The Global
Expansion of Judicial Power (1995). They found that judges had steadily encroached upon
policy-making prerogatives hitherto reserved to elected representatives. Over the past
decade and a half a vast empirical literature on this topic has sprung up, spanning law and poli-
tics (Caldeira et al. 2008; Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2002; Hirschl 2004; Stone Sweet 2000). These
studies remain for the most part rooted in older debates concerning the legitimate powers of
the judiciary in a democracy (e.g., Bickel 1962; Ely 1980). Similar preoccupations have also
loomed large in recent work by normative legal and political theorists on judicial review
and the nature of constitutionalism (Bellamy 2007; Dworkin 1998; Waldron 2006).
This special issue reﬂects and seeks to advance these debates on the impact and legiti-
macy of the judicialisation of democratic politics in two main ways. First, it brings together
scholars holding different perspectives—some more critical of and others more favourable
to judicialisation—and who employ different methods, be they normative, qualitative or quan-
titative, that reﬂect the different disciplinary approaches to the topic found in law, political
science and sociology. Second, it focuses speciﬁcally on the contrasts and complementarities
of law and politics as modes of democratic representation. On one hand, the transfer of policy-
making power from popularly elected representatives to a judicial elite would seem to subvert
democracy in a fairly straightforward, zero-sum way. On the other hand, political represen-
tation has defects that might justify remedial judicial intervention. Indeed, a representative
democracy, of the kind typical of all contemporary democratic polities, would have been classi-
ﬁed as a form of ‘oligarchy’ by Aristotle, and has been viewed since the eighteenth century as a
mode of elite rather than popular rule (Bellamy 2003). Some scholars have suggested that judi-
cialisation can compensate for the representative failures of democracy by providing a venue
for a more active participation by citizens (Kavanagh 2009), while others see in judges a form of
representativeness akin to that of legislators (Kyristsis 2006). The articles in this special issue
probe these accounts of judicialisation and explore their implications for the role of courts
within a representative democracy.
Democracy involves an ‘input’ and an ‘output’ aspect, as that form of government of the
people that is both ‘by’ the people and ‘for’ the people. Indeed, democratic theorists have typi-
cally linked democratic means, whereby rule is ‘by’ the people rather than a privileged ruling
class, with democratic ends, or government that is ‘for’ the people rather than a sub-section of
them, regarding the one as the guarantee of the other. A standard argument, associated with
J. S. Mill among others, runs as follows: if a group of people are all roughly equally effected by
the totality of collective decisions, and may be regarded as the best judges of their own inter-
est most of the time—especially when moral and epistemological disagreements prevail—
then they all should have an equal say in those decisions. This does not mean that all decisions
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must be made by consensus—an impossible goal. Majority rule, which treats all views neutrally
and impartially and is positively responsive to those views most favoured by voters, proves suf-
ﬁcient; offering a public mechanism that gives equal concern and respect to each citizen’s
interests and views (May 1952). Not only are there grounds, associated with the Condorcet
jury theorem (Condorcet 1976), for believing that, when conditions justifying democracy
prevail, majority rule is more likely to produce decisions in the public interest than rule by
any minority, however well informed, but also democracy offers an alternative to guardianship
by an elite with the consequent risks of arbitrary rule (Dahl 1989).
In complex and pluralist societies elite judgements about the public interest—no matter
how conscientiously made or expertly informed—will always risk partiality, reﬂecting a limited
knowledge of how citizens will come to think and act in the future. Few if any social and econ-
omic issues admit of purely expert solutions. Causal relations are so complex that almost all
policies produce unintended consequences, as well as raising normative and evaluative
issues for which no consensus is justiﬁed. Democracy responds to these epistemological difﬁ-
culties by operating as an information-gathering process which allows each person affected by
a decision an equal inﬂuence upon it; constituting a direct or indirect means whereby different
views and interests can be related to each other in ways that treat them with equal concern
and respect (Christiano 2008).
Ever since the eighteenth century and the American and French Revolutions, it has been
customary for democratic decision-making in the West to be mediated by ‘representatives’,
who are somehow or other authorised to act in lieu and on behalf of nominally equal citizens.
Representation might seem prima facie to be undemocratic, with the representatives forming
an elite who actually rule rather than the people themselves. At best, it substitutes an equal, if
imperfect, degree of control over the selection of decision-makers for direct participation in
decision-making. Yet, the selection process may indirectly impact on decision-making too.
To see why, we need some preliminary conceptual clariﬁcations of what ‘representation’
and ‘representative democracy’ mean.
Hannah Pitkin has deﬁned political representation as ‘acting in the interest of the rep-
resented, in a manner responsive to them’ (Pitkin 1967: 209). A representative ‘acts for or in
the place of the represented’ for some practical purpose, being an ‘agent . . . related to the rep-
resented as “another self”, as somehow “standing in his place” in the practical arena’ (Diggs
1968: 29–30). Pitkin’s account yields four main ideal types of representation: delegation, in
which representatives ‘act as’ the represented; trusteeship, in which representatives ‘act for’
the represented; and descriptive and symbolic representation, in which representatives ‘stand
as’ and ‘stand for’ the represented respectively (Pitkin 1967). A delegate acts ‘as’ the relevant
principal instructs him or her, so that ‘the principal acts through the representative . . . in the
sense that he shares responsibility for the act of his representative’ (Diggs 1968: 32–3). By con-
trast, a trustee enjoys much more discretion, being signiﬁcantly more removed from the prin-
cipal’s will (Pettit 2006). Trusteeship is bestowed by a grantor, who in a democratic context may
be either a high ofﬁcial or the public themselves, to act ‘for’ a third party beneﬁciary (such as
the people) who is not available, best placed or, in some cases, considered fully competent, to
act on their own account, and who may have only a limited say in the selection and control of
their representative (cf. Grifﬁths and Wollheim 1960). The normative basis of trusteeship is sub-
stantive representation in which an agent serves—but may also deﬁne—the interests of the
principal. Finally, descriptive and symbolic representatives depict the represented by virtue
of either some shared characteristic, such as might emerge from a statistical sample of the rel-
evant population, or a symbolic quality with which those they represent identify.
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Although analytically distinct, all four forms of representation are related in various ways.
Delegation and trusteeship form a continuum, ranging from those who are provided with a
strict mandate to act in a certain way in a speciﬁc and somewhat limited context—such as
proxy voters at a shareholders’ meeting who cast their vote as instructed by their principal,
to a trustee who has been empowered by others to look after the interests of one incapable
of doing so for him or herself—such as the legal guardian of an orphaned newborn. Yet
between (and even within) these extremes lie a variety of forms of representation (Pitkin
(1967: 121) lists ﬁve, and see Bellamy and Castiglione 2011: 122–3) in which trustees are del-
egated to some degree to act within a given brief, and delegates can exercise their discretion
to a certain extent within the constraints of their mandate. For example, a lawyer standardly
employs her expertise to act for a client in the manner of a trustee. However, in so doing
she must also act under instructions even if these have been granted by a person or body
other than her client or merely involves her client’s passive assent. Potentially, therefore, her
actions may be censured for lack of due care or her advice overruled. Consequently, she
also acts in some measure as a delegate of the client either directly or indirectly, via the
grantor. Meanwhile, the capacity of agents to act ‘as’ or ‘for’ their principal is often enhanced
by the degree to which they are viewed as standing ‘as’ or ‘for’ them due to certain shared
characteristics—be it a shared gender, ethnicity, social background or set of ideological, cul-
tural, religious or other beliefs—or an accepted symbolic attribute, such as monarchs are com-
monly held to possess.
Within a democracy, how people are represented will change according to context and
be shaped by the processes of authorisation and accountability that deﬁne the representative’s
role. These processes delineate the ways and degree to which representative agents act in the
interests of and respond to their principals, as well as the extent to which they stand ‘as’ or ‘for’
the people by virtue of being themselves in some way or other ‘of’ them. They also structure
how far representatives can be deemed to do so in a democratic manner, by virtue of being
authorised by democratic means or being held accountable for their pursuit of democratic
ends. Thus, representatives who are subject to strict instructions from the electorate, and
subject to recall should they diverge from their mandate, act literally as their voters direct.
Here the difference between selecting decision-makers and making decisions is negligible.
Similarly, the ancient democratic practice of sortition or a modern version involving sampling
supports the selection of representatives who may stand ‘for’ the people and act ‘as’ them
through being sufﬁciently similar to them to be representative of their interests and ideas.
Here the process of authorisation aims at a democratic outcome even if it does not involve
an explicitly democratic input. Yet, neither of these mechanisms is widely used or usable
today (Bobbio 1987). Politicians have to take too many decisions, many of which are unforesee-
able or involve technical expertise, for them to be subjected to too tight a mandate. Likewise,
the people of modern democracies are so diverse along so many dimensions, that sortition
offers a haphazard way of selecting representatives who could stand ‘for’ the people, while
sampling begs the question of what features ‘of’ people should be politically represented.
These problems are in certain respects generic to the very nature of representation and
its central paradox: namely, that it involves making present what is not present (Pitkin 1967).
Representatives are constituted by a deliberate act of will that stands apart from the represen-
tative agent, opening up a ‘gap’ or source of alienation between them and the represented
that can never quite be closed, and which in a certain sense ‘sets up’ the representative to
go adrift (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999; Epstein and Sharyn 1994). At once, the danger
arises that the representative’s attributes differ from those of the represented enough to
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call his or her representativeness into question. For the range of representatives among whom
principals must choose may itself involve biases (Huber and Shipan 2000; Rogowski 1981). For
example, in contemporary democracies candidates for public ofﬁce are drawn nearly always
from the upper or upper middle classes (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Norris 1997). Only a
minority even of this class can surmount what are often forbidding material barriers to stand-
ing for ofﬁce or attract enough favourable media attention (cf. Manin 1997; Norris and Love-
nduski 1995). These circumstances combine to act as a ﬁlter, a de facto vetting process (Pitkin
2004). In addition, the voters’ discernment may be seriously impaired by intrinsic cognitive
weaknesses exploited by the media and other elites (Cox 1997; Hobolt 2009). All of these short-
comings impose severe prior limitations on the voter’s act of will, over and above the intention-
ality gap that emerges between principal and agent (the so-called ‘agent drift’). Pitkin even
laments that representatives have come to threaten democracy, having ‘supplanted [it]
instead of serving it’. Representative government has become ‘a new form of oligarchy . . .
[o]ur governors have become a self-perpetuating elite that rules – or rather, administers –
passive or privatized masses of people’, with the result that ‘ordinary people [are] excluded
from public life’ (Pitkin 2004: 335, 339; see also Guarnieri 2013). Others have portrayed
modern democracy as ‘an elective aristocracy’ (Manin 1997: 145) or ‘competitive oligarchy’
(Manin et al. 1999: 4), since voter choices are conﬁned to an elite class that is already
unrepresentative.
As a result, it is often thought that at best representatives can act as trustees. This pos-
ition is identiﬁed above all with Edmund Burke, and given its inﬂuence his critique of del-
egation and defence of trusteeship merits some discussion. Burke claimed that
representatives ought not to be chosen because their views coincided with those of their
voters but as individuals who could be trusted to exercise their independent judgement in
an informed, conscientious and impartial manner. As he informed his prospective constituents
in Bristol, though representatives ought to pay attention to the opinions of their electors, gov-
ernment and legislation were matters of judgement and reason and they elected representa-
tives to employ these intellectual and moral powers on their behalf.
Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the
strictest union . . . and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. [. . .] But his
unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacri-
ﬁce to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your plea-
sure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse
of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his
judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacriﬁces it to your opinion.
(Burke 1774)
On the one hand, representatives ought to possess sufﬁcient experience and expertise
for their reasoning to be superior to that of most of their electors As he put it when, true to his
word, he championed free trade with Ireland in the teeth of his constituents’ decided prefer-
ence for protectionism (Ayling 1988):
Faithful watchmen we ought to be over the rights and privileges of the people. But . . . I should
be ashamed to show my face before them, if I changed my ground as they cried up or cried
down men or things or opinions,—if I wavered and shifted about with every change . . . as to
the detail of particular measures, or to any general schemes of policy, they have neither
enough of speculation in the closet nor of experience in business to decide upon it. They
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can well see whether we are tools of a court or their honest servants . . . but of the particular
merits of a measure I have other standards. (Burke 1780)
On the other hand, and in many respects more importantly, he contended deliberation
in parliament would hardly be meaningful unless representatives could reason independently.
If representatives were delegates of particular interests then they would be unable to deliber-
ate with other representatives on the general interest of the nation. A representative had the
duty of being a Member of Parliament rather than a member for a given constituency:
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which inter-
ests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but
parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where,
not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from
the general reason of the whole. (Burke 1774)
The democratic credentials of the Burkean representative are weak but not non-existent.
Representatives are authorised by the electorate, and Burke credited them with the good
sense to be able to choose wise and informed decision-makers, even if they were not up to
making wise and informed decisions for themselves. Trustees are also accountable to those
who have chosen to trust them, who may throw them out if they feel that trust has been
abused or their representatives simply turn out to be less wise and informed than they had
thought. However, these democratic aspects of his account have usually been thought insufﬁ-
cient to remove its essentially elitist caste.
The accuracy of Burke’s argument as an account of actual existing representative democ-
racies also proves questionable. In certain respects, and despite the problems noted above,
contemporary politicians are far closer to delegates than Burkean trustees, and can avoid
some of the problems Burke associated with delegation. Unlike Burke, today’s politicians cam-
paign not so much as individual reasoners as members of parties and on the basis of their
party’s manifesto (Klingermann et al. 1994). These manifestos are drafted with an eye to
winning electoral support and so attempt to accord with the opinions—the express prefer-
ences—of sufﬁcient voters to gain election. Moreover, within the legislature politicians tend
to be whipped to adopt the party line, and remain remarkably faithful to their electoral com-
mitments. Nevertheless, that need not mean that representatives are delegates of particular
interests in a narrow sense. Because they are for the most part elected in national elections
that in parliamentary systems lead to the formation of governments, incentives exist at the
electoral phase to produce programmes of government capable of winning the support of
at least a majority of public opinion—a requirement that the need in many systems for gov-
ernments to build and sustain coalitions continues into the legislative phase. Meanwhile,
parties have ideological commitments that constrain the arguments and policies they will
choose in order to appeal to the electorate and the alliances they will make.
Admittedly, both the electoral and the legislative process prove less high-minded than
Burke had aspired for them to be, with bargaining often more important than arguing and
reasoning. Given the diversity and complexity of modern societies, noted above, it can be dif-
ﬁcult for parties to accommodate all views and interests sufﬁciently adequately to give them
an equal voice. Though pluralist theorists of democracy have noted that in modern societies
the frequent need to build majorities on the basis of shifting coalitions of minorities makes
the ‘tyranny of the majority’ less likely than liberal theorists imagined, it remains a logical
and occasional real possibility that groups with less bargaining power than others will be
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unfairly marginalised in the democratic process. Meanwhile, and in some respects more signiﬁ-
cantly, the need for coalition making can alienate voters if they feel it entails representatives
making compromises that sacriﬁce principles to power—a feeling likely to be exacerbated the
less voters feel they can identify with politicians (Bellamy 2012). As Norberto Bobbio noted
many years ago, the practices of any workable representative democracy seem doomed to
offer citizens a series of ‘broken promises’ by failing to live up to the largely unachievable stan-
dards set by ideal participatory theories of democracy (Bobbio 1987: 26–7).
Some commentators have seen the courts as a potential remedy for these democratic
shortcomings:
[P]residentialism and parliamentarism are not the only forms of democratic system on offer,
as the political scientists customarily claim. It is logical to think that the third branch – courts
– could also be dominant in some sort of democratic governments as presidents and parlia-
ments can be. What seems to get in the way of this idea, however, is the persistent view that
courts are undemocratic, therefore unsuitable for being the lead institution in a democratic
polity. (Scheppele 2005: 44)
Nevertheless, they claim that the ﬂaws of representation and representative democracy,
especially that ‘what voters voted for [i]s not what they got’, are such that it may be argued that
courts can be ‘more popularly responsive’ and ‘democratically thoughtful’ bodies than parlia-
ments (Scheppele 2005: 52).
Courts can be representative in some ways. A common law system especially, which is
built on judicial precedent instead of a legislated code, empowers courts to carry on, indepen-
dently of legislatures, functions that may merit being called representative. An enormous
number of varied interests come before the courts over time, each advocated by its own attor-
ney. Of course, a similar range comes before political representatives as well. However, we saw
how commitments to a broader constituency or their party and sheer time constraints may
mean that they fail to represent them adequately. By contrast, attorneys are obligated to
act on behalf of their clients alone. As we noted, attorneys act as both delegates, following
their clients’ instructions, and as trustees, who have the expertise to steer the case through
the legal jungle (cf. Grifﬁths and Wollheim 1960). As such, they do not presume to know
their clients’ interests better than they do, merely how best to pursue them most effectively
in court. In these respects, attorneys may be more democratically representative than
elected politicians.
Courts that involve a common law trial jury can also offer a form of representation in the
sense of sortition or sampling. However, to be fully effective, jurors must be aware of their
power of nulliﬁcation (cf. Spooner 1852). A striking aspect of contemporary judicial practice
in the United States, where the judicialisation of politics began (Dezalay and Garth 2002;
Tate and Vallinder 1995), has been the marginalisation of the jury (DeWolfe Howe 1939;
Ostrowski 2001)—to the point where many commentators complain it has become little
more than a rubberstamp whose independent judgment is routinely suppressed by the
‘instructions’ of judges who may not be impartial (Federal Judicial Center 1996: 100; Sand
and Rakoff 1993).1 When functioning properly, though, the jury may be said to be reasonably
representative of the community’s conscience over a large number of cases.
Arguably, though, courts are limited as representative fora because the least representa-
tive actors in any legal system are the judges. With the exception of some American states,
judges are not elected and cannot be voted out of ofﬁce. This precludes counting them as ‘del-
egates’ of the people, even if the elected representatives who appoint them respond to direct
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or indirect political pressures when doing so. At this point, some commentators, invoking
Burke, try to assimilate judges to trustees (Sajo´ 2012; Stone Sweet 2003). The analogy,
however, is tenuous, as the Burkean trustee is not only authorised directly by his constituents,
but is directly accountable for breaches of his ﬁduciary duties to them—be they the result of
corruption, bad luck or incompetence (Pettit 2006). As Burke remarked, notwithstanding the
independence of the representative’s policy judgement, his constituents ‘can well see
whether we are tools of a court or their honest servants’, and can vote out those who prove
to be the former or whom merely displease them (as they famously did to Burke). Yet, at
least in Europe, the trend has been toward removing the judiciary from any democratic auth-
orisation and accountability. Instead, judges are increasingly authorised by and accountable to
no one but themselves (Guarnieri 2013; Parau 2012, 2013; Piana 2010). If this trend becomes
consolidated, the supposed ‘beneﬁciaries’ of their ‘trusteeship’ will ﬁnd themselves in no pos-
ition to ensure judges perform their duties.
In so far as representation by attorneys and juries is mediated by judges, the claim that
courts can act as democratic representatives proves decidedly limited. Courts may constitute
an alternative venue for ‘representation’ (cf. Saward 2010), but only ‘by default’ as it were, in
that contemporary polities offer a limited repertory of institutions to which one can turn to
further one’s claims. More importantly, courts may work for some people and types of
claim, but, like parliaments, may not work for others. Every court case features a loser as
well as a winner, and those with deeper pockets and better organisational resources tend to
fare better than the less well-off or harder to organise.
Judges undoubtedly resemble political representatives in having to arbitrate between
conﬂicting interests, but this shared feature highlights the judicial role of politicians rather
than the representative character of judges. A higher law like the King’s writ or a statute of par-
liament or a written constitution may be ‘committed’ to judges for interpretation, but the irre-
versibility of the commitment and the wide scope for judicial discretion in legal interpretation
erodes the comparison with even the weakest forms of democratic trusteeship. Judges may act
as trustees of a decision (such as a statute, constitution, or international convention) that was
made or legitimised democratically. However, trustees can betray their trust. Indeed, the
common law of trust is concerned to a large extent with the remedies that are available in
those cases where the trust is abused by the trustee (Pettit 2006). Two key questions arise
as a consequence: what happens when judges go beyond their allotted task of upholding
democratically endorsed decisions? And how can one tell when they have done so? Judges
might be thought to have betrayed the trust placed in them when their decisions reﬂect
their own preferences rather than those of the elected representatives who crafted the
laws, constitutions or conventions in question. Such documents are notoriously vague and
incomplete, and in any case must be deployed to meet individual cases and new circum-
stances that their democratic framers could never have anticipated. Hence, judges will
always need to exercise some discretion. The difﬁculty lies in providing criteria and a
process for deciding when discretion has ceased to be democratically legitimate, and a
remedy for those situations where this is believed to be the case.
The process of judicialisation has raised these issues from the beginning and continues
to do so across different jurisdictions and levels of governance, be they national or suprana-
tional courts. From classic US Supreme Court cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393 (1857), which infamously held that African Americans, whether slave or free, fell outside
the protection of the Constitution and so could not be US citizens, and denied the federal gov-
ernment had the right to regulate slavery in the territories; to some of the latest decisions of
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contemporary courts, such as that of the Chamber of the Second Section of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Lautsi v. Italy banning cruciﬁxes from Italian classrooms,
or the cases of private property restitution in Romania after 1989 that resulted in elderly
tenants who had been born on the property and lived there all their lives being evicted
onto the street (Parau 2012)—courts have made decisions that are questionable in democratic
terms, issuing neither from a democratic process or serving democratic ends. Of course, they
have also made decisions that may be unpopular with sections of the electorate and their
representatives yet are arguably supportive of democratic rights, such as the ECtHR’s decision
in Hirst v. UK (2), which questioned the imposition of a blanket ban on voting by all prisoners
serving a custodial sentence, whatever the severity of their crime or length of their sentence.
Courts may sometimes serve democracy better than parliaments. Yet, as the popular reaction
to the Hirst decision illustrates, when they can be said to have done so is rarely uncontroversial,
and the ability of parliaments to override their decisions on such occasions has become
increasingly difﬁcult as the power of judges has grown.
This special issue does not propose to solve this conundrum but merely to explore its
different aspects from a variety of political and socio-legal perspectives. This goal is achieved
by examining the dynamic between courts and representative democracy at various stages of
the judicialisation process, from prospective institutional design, through concrete actuation,
to retrospective evaluation.
Cristina Parau explores judicial empowerment in terms of institutional designs that are
prior to any actual policy-making by judges, showing how certain templates of judicial govern-
ance of transnational origin, which fundamentally alter power relations between judges and
elected representatives, have become the norm in Eastern Europe amongst the new EU
members and the latest candidate for EU accession. The disempowerment of elected represen-
tatives is a major consequence of this trend. It has been driven by transnational networks of
legal professionals and by the ‘dormancy’ of parliaments. It is hard to avoid the conclusion
that the transnational legal professional community has simply assumed a trusteeship role.
Eric Ip addresses the institutional origins of the UK Supreme Court, arguing they lie in ‘rational’
interactions between political actors. He analyses the power dynamic involving the Supreme
Court and parliament, ﬁnding that as the courts continue to be deferential to parliament so
parliament is induced to reciprocate, complying with Supreme Court rulings even when
they impinge on its supremacy. In their respective ways, then, Ip and Parau both discuss the
role of parliaments in the judicialisation of politics.
By contrast, Daniel Kelemen argues that the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) and the ECtHR may be understood as consistently democracy-reinforcing. Both can
lay claim to democratic authorisation via the appointment process, and both serve demo-
cratic ends. Lisa Vanhala and Rachel Cichowski explore in their turn how far resort to the
courts may be regarded as itself a democratic process. They examine the important role of
civil society activists in initiating the process of judicialisation by bringing policy issues
before domestic and supranational courts which formerly would have been decided by
democratically elected representatives. They then evaluate the implications for representa-
tive democracy at the domestic level, concluding that judicialisation is a double-edged
sword for representation.
Richard Bellamy and Carlo Guarnieri likewise explore the consequences for representative
democracy of the judicialisation of politics but come to more negative conclusions. Bellamy
considers the claim made by many legal and political theorists that courts have in many
respects superior democratic qualities to the electoral process. He critically reviews three
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key arguments to this effect: the ﬁrst maintains that courts provide an exemplary form of delib-
erative democracy based on public reason; the second that courts allow for citizen partici-
pation, and the third that courts provide a mechanism for representation. He contends that
though courts do uphold and even presuppose certain democratic norms, such as treating
all as equal before the law, they possess these features and exercise them in a democratic
manner not through being independent of or above electoral democracy, but because
courts depend upon and are a part of the broader democratic political system. It is the
extent to which that remains the case that is the focus of Guarnieri’s contribution. He
reviews the trends evident in the latest reforms of judicial institutions and their impact on
the role of judges in Europe. He notes how the costs and beneﬁts of the move towards ever
greater judicial independence and its implications for representative democracy have yet to
be adequately assessed.
Finally, Ran Hirschl provides a commentary on the special issue as a whole. He situates
the various contributions in the context of an overview and assessment of the global move-
ment towards the judicialisation of politics. His Epilogue draws on the empirical research inves-
tigating the correlations between judicialisation, on the one side, and democratisation and
human development, on the other. He concludes that there is little reason to believe that judi-
cialisation advances either of them. The link between democracy and development proves far
stronger, while democracy upholds the rule of law rather than vice versa. In sum, courts may
supplement democratic politics in many important ways, not least by offering new avenues for
representing the interests of citizens. However, their capacity to do so depends on their being
embedded within an effective democratic social and political system. The dilemma prompted
by the judicialisation of politics is that if taken too far it risks undermining the very democratic
structures that render it both legitimate and effective.
NOTE
1. US v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2nd Cir. 1997): ‘Nulliﬁcation is, by deﬁnition, a violation of a
juror’s oath to apply the law as instructed by the court – in the words of the standard oath
administered to jurors in the federal courts, to render a true verdict according to the law and
the evidence’. This suggests that the modern practice is repressive of jury nulliﬁcation. On
the other hand, the precedents of the common law are clear. For example, in Bushel’s Case
(1670) 124 E.R. 1006 the Court of King’s Bench admitted the right of jury nulliﬁcation in
English common law; Crown v. John Peter Zenger 17 Howell’s St. Tr. 675 (1735) conﬁrmed
the right of jury nulliﬁcation in the American colonies. An interesting research question
might be whether the repression of the jury goes hand in hand with the judicialisation of
politics.
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